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REVISITING A CLASSIC PROBLEM IN 
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: IS A MINISTER 
A LABORER? 
Tammy Gales* & Lawrence M. Solan** 
ABSTRACT 
This study presents a new analysis of an iconic United States 
Supreme Court case, Holy Trinity Church v. United States (1892). The 
question in Holy Trinity Church concerned whether a law making it 
illegal to pay the transportation of a person entering the U.S. under 
contract to perform “labor or service of any kind” applied to a wealthy 
Manhattan church that had paid to bring its new rector from England 
to New York. The Supreme Court unanimously ruled that the law did 
not apply to the church’s contract, relying first on the ordinary 
meaning of “labor” and second on the legislative history of the single 
construction “labor or service.” 
Highlighting the use of corpus linguistic methods, this study tests 
the arguments presented by the Court and reveals new insights through 
an analysis of historic and contemporary reference corpora and a 
specialized corpus of U.S. statutes. The results demonstrate that the 
disjunctive phrase “labor or service” appeared to be a legal term of art 
with narrow interpretation that would exclude clergy, but around the 
time of Holy Trinity Church, slight variations on the phrase (e.g., 
pluralization, conjunction, and modification) applied to contexts with 
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broader meaning. When examining “labor” as an independent term, 
those who labored were generally not clergy and the description of the 
activities of clergy was typically not described as labor, although 
examination evidenced instances of both. The findings demonstrate 
the importance of consulting corpora in the evaluation of statutory and 
ordinary meaning and considering the sociohistorical contexts in 
which it occurs. 
INTRODUCTION 
Our goal in this article is to demonstrate how the use of linguistic 
corpora in historical cases—when used with proper caution—can add 
significantly to conventional tools of statutory interpretation, 
especially in cases in which meaning may have changed over time. In 
doing so, we use the methods described by Lee and Mouritsen1 as a 
springboard to make new contributions to the study of Holy Trinity 
Church v. United States2—perhaps the most studied United States case 
engaging methods of statutory interpretation. 
Holy Trinity Church concerned whether a law making it illegal to 
pay the transportation of a person entering the U.S. under a contract 
“to perform labor or service of any kind” applied to a wealthy 
Manhattan church that paid to bring its new rector from London to 
New York.3 In 1892, the Supreme Court decided the answer to the 
issue was no.4 Justice Brewer’s opinion for a unanimous Court relied, 
as its first argument, on the Justices’ sense of the typical use of the 
relevant language.5 
Because of its two later arguments, relying on legislative history to 
respond to the fact that the list of exceptions did not include members 
of the clergy6 and recognizing that Congress—knowing that the U.S. 
                                                                                                             
 1. Thomas R. Lee & Stephen C. Mouritsen, Judging Ordinary Meaning, 127 YALE L.J. 788, 788 
(2018). 
 2. Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 459 (1892). 
 3. Id. at 457–58. 
 4. Id. at 459. 
 5. Id. at 463. 
 6. Id. at 464–65. 
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was founded as a Christian nation—would be unlikely to have 
intended to impede religion so aggressively,7 the case has received 
great attention and continues to provoke debate as it rumbles through 
its second century.8 The fact that the first main argument is about 
ordinary meaning, a conventional argument at that, is sometimes lost 
in the literature. 
The facts are as follows. In 1885, Congress passed the Alien 
Contract Labor Law.9 Section 1 contained the main provision: 
 
[I]t shall be unlawful for any person, company, partnership, 
or corporation, in any manner whatsoever, to prepay the 
transportation, or in any way assist or encourage the 
importation or migration of any alien or aliens, any foreigner 
or foreigners, into the United States, its Territories, or the 
District of Columbia, under contract or agreement, parol or 
special, express or implied, made previous to the importation 
or migration of such alien or aliens, foreigner or foreigners, 
to perform labor or service of any kind in the United States, 
its Territories, or the District of Columbia.10 
 
Section 5 listed exceptions: 
 
[N]or shall this act be so construed as to prevent any person, 
or persons, partnership, or corporation from engaging, under 
contract or agreement, skilled workman in foreign countries 
to perform labor in the United States in or upon any new 
industry not at present established in the United States: 
Provided, That skilled labor for that purpose cannot be 
otherwise obtained; nor shall the provisions of this act apply 
to professional actors, artists, lecturers, or singers, nor to 
                                                                                                             
 7. Id. at 465–72. 
 8. Compare Carol Chomsky, Unlocking the Mysteries of Holy Trinity: Spirit, Letter, and History in 
Statutory Interpretation, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 901, 911–16 (2000), with Adrian Vermeule, Legislative 
History and the Limits of Judicial Competence: The Untold Story of Holy Trinity Church, 50 STAN. L. 
REV. 1833, 1835–37 (1998), and ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS 
AND THE LAW 18–23 (1998). 
 9. Alien Contract Labor Law of 1885, ch. 164, § 1, 23 Stat. 332, 332 (amended 1887, 1888). 
 10. Id.  
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persons employed strictly as personal or domestic servants: 
Provided, That nothing in this act shall be construed as 
prohibiting any individual from assisting any member of his 
family or any relative or personal friend, to migrate from any 
foreign country to the United States, for the purpose of 
settlement here.11 
 
In 1891, Congress added “ministers of any religious 
denomination, . . . persons belonging to any recognized profession,” 
and “professors for colleges and seminaries” to the list of exceptions.12 
But that was too late for Manhattan’s Church of the Holy Trinity and 
the minister it hired from London under contract, the Reverend Doctor 
Edward Walpole Warren.13 The district court had already prosecuted 
and fined the church for violating the law in 1888.14 
The church appealed to the Supreme Court, which ruled 
unanimously that the law did not apply to the church’s contract with 
its new clergyman. The Court first articulated this often-quoted 
statement about the interpretation of statutes: 
 
It is a familiar rule that a thing may be within the letter of the 
statute and yet not within the statute, because not within its 
spirit nor within the intention of its makers. This has been 
often asserted, and the Reports are full of cases illustrating 
its application. This is not the substitution of the will of the 
judge for that of the legislator; for frequently words of 
general meaning are used in a statute, words broad enough 
to include an act in question, and yet a consideration of the 
whole legislation, or of the circumstances surrounding its 
enactment, or of the absurd results which follow from giving 
such broad meaning to the words, makes it unreasonable to 
                                                                                                             
 11. Id. § 5, 23 Stat. at 333. 
 12. See  Immigration Act of 1891, ch. 551, § 5, 26 Stat. 1084, 1085. 
 13. See United States v. Church of the Holy Trinity, 36 F. 303, 303–04 (S.D.N.Y. 1888), rev’d, 143 
U.S. 457 (1892). 
 14. Id. There is contemporaneous evidence supporting a claim that the church brought the case 
collusively in an effort to have the law declared unconstitutional. See Chomsky, supra note 8, at 910–16. 
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believe that the legislator intended to include the particular 
act.15 
 
Though Brewer’s reference to the “spirit” of the law may strike a 
discordant note to the modern ear,16 recognizing that laws might be 
drafted in language broader than that needed to serve their purpose 
stems back to Aristotle,17 and dealing with that reality remains a matter 
of considerable disagreement among judges and scholars today.18 
The Court moved on to employ the ordinary meaning canon as its 
first interpretive argument: 
 
The common understanding of the terms “labor” and 
“laborers” does not include preaching and preachers, and it 
is to be assumed that words and phrases are used in their 
ordinary meaning. So whatever of light is thrown upon the 
statute by the language of the title indicates an exclusion 
from its penal provisions of all contracts for the employment 
of ministers, rectors, and pastors.19 
 
Yet, the Court recognized that the language of the statute was 
susceptible to an interpretation that extended beyond the evil that the 
statute was enacted to address, as had the enacting Congress.20 Not 
only was the term “labor or service of any kind” open to a broad 
interpretation (although such an interpretation would not have been 
preferred), but the list of exceptions then in effect also did not include 
members of the clergy.21 The canon expressio unius est exlusio alterius 
dictates that the passage of what appears to be a complete list of 
                                                                                                             
 15. Holy Trinity Church, 143 U.S. at 459. 
 16. SCALIA, supra note 8, at 18–22. 
 17. ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS bk. V, at 174–76 (F. H. Peters trans., Kegan Paul, Trench, 
Trübner & Co. 5th ed. 1893) (c. 384 B.C.E.). 
 18. See, e.g., Yates v. United States, 574 U.S. 528 (2015). 
 19. Holy Trinity Church, 143 U.S. at 463. 
 20. 15 CONG. REC. 6057 (1884). 
 21. But see infra note 77 and accompanying text for arguments that “lecturers” included members of 
the clergy, which is within the list of named exceptions. 
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exceptions implies that items not listed are not exceptions.22 Unable to 
modify the bill without jeopardizing passage in the current session, the 
Senate Report predicted—as Justice Brewer noted—that the courts 
would not construe the statute more broadly than required to combat 
the evil that Congress enacted the law to address.23 The Court thus 
reversed the conviction unanimously. 
I.   Corpus Linguistic Analysis in Legal Interpretation 
Fast forward 125 years. A number of legal scholars and judges have 
been collaborating with linguists to employ methods of corpus 
linguistics in the service of statutory and constitutional interpretation. 
The principal goal is to use big data that is representative of a particular 
variety of language as a source of information about ordinary meaning 
in the realm of statutes and original public meaning in constitutional 
argument. Among other things, this partnership has produced a 
symposium in the BYU Law Review,24 a number of amicus briefs filed 
in U.S. Supreme Court cases, and a 2018 article in the Yale Law 
Journal by Thomas C. Lee and Stephen R. Mouritsen, Judging 
Ordinary Meaning.25 Lee is Associate Chief Justice of the Utah 
Supreme Court and a former full-time member of the Brigham Young 
University law faculty.26 Mouritsen is Lee’s former student and law 
clerk and is trained in the methods of corpus linguistics.27 
The principal argument has been one of drawing inferences of 
ordinary meaning based upon the relative frequency of one usage over 
another with respect to a disputed term. For example, in Costello v. 
United States,28 Judge Posner, using Google News, determined that the 
                                                                                                             
 22. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., INTERPRETING LAW: A PRIMER ON HOW TO READ STATUTES AND 
THE CONSTITUTION 408 (2016) (discussing this canon from different interpretative perspectives); see also 
ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 107–11 
(2012). 
 23. Holy Trinity Church, 143 U.S. at 464–65. 
 24. Symposium, 2017 BYU L. REV. 1297 (2018). 
 25. Lee & Mouritsen, supra note 1, at 789. 
 26. See generally id.  
 27. Id. 
 28. See generally United States v. Costello, 666 F.3d 1040 (7th Cir. 2012). 
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verb “to harbor,” when used with a human object, generally implies an 
effort to hide an individual, such as harboring Jews from the Nazis.29 
He thus held that a woman living with her undocumented boyfriend 
did not “harbor” him in violation of a federal statute, absent evidence 
that she attempted to help hide him from the authorities.30 And Justice 
Lee has used corpus analysis in a number of cases, most notably State 
v. Rasabout,31 in which, in a concurring opinion, he used Brigham 
Young’s Corpus of Contemporary American English (COCA)32 to 
determine that a gang member who fired twelve shots in a drive-by 
shooting actually “discharged” his gun twelve times, based on the 
corpus’s showing that “discharge” in the context of weapons is almost 
exclusively used to describe individual shots, rather than emptying 
one’s weapon of its ammunition entirely.33 Other courts have followed 
suit, employing one or another version of corpus linguistic analysis, 
although at times with considerable controversy within the courts.34 
It should not be surprising that the legal community is turning to big 
data to determine ordinary linguistic usage. Accustomed to using 
databases such as Lexis and Westlaw, legal analysts conduct a kind of 
corpus analysis in their own right when they comb big data to 
determine how language is used in particular contexts. To take one 
well-studied case as an example, in West Virginia University Hospitals 
v. Casey,35 the issue was whether a law awarding “a reasonable 
attorney’s fee” to victorious civil rights litigants included the recovery 
of expert witness costs that the lawyers incurred.36 The expression is 
ambiguous. A reasonable attorney’s fee can mean a reasonable fee for 
the time spent by the attorney, excluding disbursements that the 
attorney makes for other litigation services, or it can refer to the 
                                                                                                             
 29. Id. at 1044. 
 30. Id. at 1050. 
 31. State v. Rasabout, 356 P.3d 1258, 1264 (Utah 2015). 
 32. Id. at 1277 (referencing COCA, which is available at https://www.english-corpora.org/coca/).  
 33. Id. 
 34. See, e.g., Wilson v. Safelite Grp., Inc., 930 F.3d 429, 440 (6th Cir. 2019) (detailing disagreement 
among judges about appropriateness of corpus linguistic methods); People v. Harris, 855 N.W.2d 832, 
838–39 (Mich. 2016) (exhibiting disagreement among justices about the appropriate search to conduct). 
 35. See generally W. Va. Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83 (1991). 
 36. Id. at 84. 
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amount that the attorney bills the client, including such costs as 
disbursements for expert witnesses and other things.37 In holding that 
the statute does not cover the recovery of expert witness fees, Justice 
Scalia, writing for a majority of six, turned to the language used in 
federal statutes that call for the recovery of attorney’s fees.38 The Court 
found: 
 
The record of statutory usage demonstrates convincingly 
that attorney’s fees and expert fees are regarded as separate 
elements of litigation cost. While some fee-shifting 
provisions, like § 1988, refer only to “attorney’s fees,” see, 
e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(k), 
many others explicitly shift expert witness fees as well as 
attorney’s fees.39 
 
Thus, by searching the United States Code, and demonstrating that 
Congress often specifies the inclusion of expert fees when it wants to 
make sure that they are recoverable, the Court supported its argument 
that the absence of such specification reasonably implies a lack of 
commitment to the recovery of expert fees.40 
In earlier work, we looked at corpus linguistic analysis of statutory 
cases with a critical eye while attempting to describe the conditions 
under which it is likely to be efficacious.41 We observed that corpus 
analysis is most useful when (a) the task is to discover the ordinary 
meaning of a statutory term; (b) the understanding of “ordinary 
meaning” is resolved; (c) there is agreement about the appropriate 
search to conduct and in which corpora to conduct it; and 
(d) inferences drawn from the absence of particular meanings from a 
corpus are not excessive. 
                                                                                                             
 37. Id. at 106–07. 
 38. Id. at 86–90. 
 39. Id. at 88. 
 40. Id. at 92. 
 41. Lawrence M. Solan & Tammy Gales, Corpus Linguistics as a Tool in Legal Interpretation, 2017 
BYU L. REV. 1311, 1313–16 (2018). 
 
8
Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 36, Iss. 5 [], Art. 7
https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol36/iss5/7
2020] REVISITING A CLASSIC PROBLEM 499 
As an initial matter, whether the ordinary meaning of a term in 
dispute should carry the day is a legal question. Courts indeed 
frequently default to the ordinary understanding of statutory terms.42 
In many cases, however, the Supreme Court has determined from the 
context of the law’s enactment that the legislature intended a meaning 
either narrower or broader than the statutory term’s ordinary usage 
would dictate.43 Moreover, many statutory terms have particular legal 
meanings even if they also have ordinary, nontechnical meanings. 
Sometimes, these senses overlap, creating difficult interpretive 
problems and difficult decisions for the corpus linguist as to which 
corpus, if any, to use in the analysis.44 
Second, as Lee and Mouritsen document,45 the Supreme Court does 
not have a uniform concept of ordinary meaning.46 In Holy Trinity 
Church v. United States, the principal subject of this article, frequency 
of usage appears to carry the day, whereas in McBoyle v. United 
States,47 in which the Supreme Court unanimously held that a stolen 
airplane does not come within the meaning of “vehicle” for purposes 
of construing the National Motor Vehicle Theft Act, Justice Holmes 
relied on the image that first comes to mind upon hearing the term.48 
Recent work by Kevin Tobia argues persuasively that corpus linguistic 
analysis is especially adept at identifying prototypical usage of a 
term.49 Psychologists argue that we base our sense of what is 
prototypical more on what has the essential features of the concept at 
                                                                                                             
 42. See ESKRIDGE, JR., supra note 22, at 42; see also LAWRENCE M. SOLAN, THE LANGUAGE OF 
STATUTES 53 (2010). See generally BRIAN G. SLOCUM, ORDINARY MEANING: A THEORY OF THE MOST 
FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE OF LEGAL INTERPRETATION (2015). 
 43. Yates v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1074, 1077 (2015) (finding a narrower than ordinary meaning 
applied); Bond v. United States, 572 U.S. 844, 858 (2014) (finding a narrower than ordinary meaning 
applied); Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 400 (1991) (finding a broader than ordinary meaning applied). 
See generally Solan & Gales, supra note 41 (discussing these and similar cases). 
 44. Evan C. Zoldan, Corpus Linguistics and the Dream of Objectivity, 50 SETON HALL L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2020). 
 45. Lee & Mouritsen, supra note 1, at 798. 
 46. SLOCUM, supra note 42, at 81; see Lee & Mouritsen, supra note 1, at 798. 
 47. See generally McBoyle v. United States, 283 U.S. 25 (1931). 
 48. Id. at 26.  
 49. Kevin P. Tobia, Testing Ordinary Meaning: An Experimental Assessment of What Dictionary 
Definitions and Linguistic Usage Data Tell Legal Interpreters, 133 HARV. L. REV. (forthcoming 2020). 
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hand than on central tendency.50 The giraffe is the prototypical tall 
animal because it is exaggeratedly tall, not because we see more 
giraffes than, say, camels.51 
Third, a similar issue arises from time to time over what search is 
appropriate once one decides that a corpus may be helpful in principle. 
In one Supreme Court case, Muscarello v. United States,52 Justice 
Breyer wrote for the majority that a particular meaning of the word 
“carry” was ordinary in part because one-third of usages in a corpus of 
news articles conveyed the same meaning.53 The issue was whether the 
defendant’s having a gun in his car as he drove to a drug crime 
constituted “carrying . . . a firearm” under the relevant statute.54 
Breyer searched news articles that contained the words “carry,” 
“weapon,” and “vehicle” (and synonyms of them).55 As Mouritsen 
points out, however, by including the word “vehicle” in the search, 
Breyer preordained the result.56 Instead, he should have searched 
“weapon” and “carry” (and their synonyms) occurring in close 
proximity, and then determined the extent to which “carry” in that 
context meant carrying the weapon in a vehicle.57 Mouritsen did so 
using COCA and found that carrying a weapon in a vehicle defined the 
context only one-sixth as often as did carrying a weapon on one’s 
person.58 
Fourth, as noted above, it is not enough to observe that one meaning 
in a corpus predominates over another. We call this the “blue pitta” 
problem. The blue pitta is a bird of Asia, not mentioned at all in 
COCA.59 Is it any less a bird for that reason? Of course not. A law 
prohibiting the killing of birds in a nature reserve would certainly not 
                                                                                                             
 50. Elizabeth B. Lynch et al., Tall Is Typical: Central Tendency, Ideal Dimensions & Graded Category 
Structure Among Tree Experts & Novices, 28 MEMORY & COGNITION 41, 41 (2000). 
 51. Id. 
 52. Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125 (1998). 
 53. Id. at 131. 
 54. Id. at 127. 
 55. Id. at 131. 
 56. Stephen C. Mouritsen, The Dictionary Is Not a Fortress: Definitional Fallacies and a 
Corpus-Based Approach to Plain Meaning, 2010 BYU L. REV. 1915, 1946–48. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. at 1960–61. 
 59. Solan & Gales, supra note 41, at 1315. 
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exempt the killing of bird species that are not spoken of often. On the 
contrary, if anything, rare birds would be more highly valued. 
Americans do not talk much about blue pittas, but that has nothing to 
do with their membership in the category bird. 
Consider Smith v. United States,60 a predecessor to Muscarello, in 
which a divided Supreme Court held that the defendant had used a 
firearm in a drug trafficking crime when he attempted to trade his 
unloaded machine gun for cocaine.61 Justice Scalia wrote a strong 
dissent, arguing that when one thinks of using a gun, one thinks of 
using it as a weapon, not as a thing of value.62 A corpus search shows 
that he was right: when people speak of using a gun, they speak of 
using it as a weapon. To make his argument stronger, however, we 
suggest Scalia might have also shown that people indeed speak of 
exchanging a weapon for something of value, but when they do so they 
use words other than “use,” such as “exchange” or “trade.” Our own 
search of COCA shows that this is indeed the case.63 We have made 
similar suggestions with respect to other cases that have been 
subjected to corpus analysis.64 
Historical cases, such as the one discussed in this article, require us 
to focus on a fifth issue: the importance of deciding which corpora to 
consult. In many cases, especially historical ones, that decision often 
requires consulting more than one corpus. We will see that even 
corpora that are structured to balance data from various genres are 
selective in the examples they include. The fact that these corpora are 
intended to be understood in their ordinary sense becomes nonobvious 
when the terms in the disputed law can be understood alternatively as 
either (1) ordinary language or (2) as language that has a history of 
interpretation within legal discourse.65  
                                                                                                             
 60. See generally Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223 (1993). 
 61. Id. at 241. 
 62. Id. at 245. 
 63. See Corpus of Contemporary American English, ENGLISH-CORPORA.ORG, https://www.english-
corpora.org/coca/ [https://perma.cc/8Q4P-XNYY] (last visited Nov. 7, 2019) [hereinafter COCA]. On 
February 6, 2019, the authors searched “weapon” co-occurring with synonyms of “exchange.” Leading 
collocates were “trade” and “switch”; “use” did not occur. 
 64. Solan & Gales, supra note 41, at 1354–56 (discussing State v. Rasabout). 
 65. Frederick Schauer, On the Relationship Between Legal and Ordinary Language, in SPEAKING OF 
 
11
Gales and Solan: Statutory Interpretation, Supreme Court, Labor
Published by Reading Room,
502 GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 36:Spec. Issue 
II.   Our Method 
Below, we provide findings from corpus linguistic analyses that 
investigate the language of the Alien Contract Labor Law at issue in 
Holy Trinity Church. In conducting the analyses, we employ a number 
of different corpora and corpus tools that allow us to trace the meaning 
of “labor or service” in statutory and ordinary meaning over time. In 
particular, we consulted and used: 
 
•  United States Statutes at Large (USSL) 
This specialized statutory corpus66 contains 835,743 
words from 131 statutes from the years 1789–2008 that 
use (or refer to) the words “labor”67 and “service.” We 
used AntConc, a software program designed for corpus 
analysis, for the analysis.68 
• The Corpus of Historical American English   
(COHA) 
This corpus contains more than 400 million words of 
written texts (fiction, magazines, newspaper articles, and 
nonfiction books) equally divided by decade from 1810–
2010.69 
• The Corpus of Contemporary American English 
(COCA) 
                                                                                                             
LANGUAGE AND LAW: CONVERSATIONS ON THE WORK OF PETER TIERSMA 35, 35–36 (Lawrence M. Solan 
et al. eds., 2015). See generally Zoldan, supra note 44. 
 66. Corpus linguists distinguish between general (or reference) corpora and specialized corpora in 
terms of representativeness, balance, and design. The U.S. Statutes at Large (USSL) is a specialized 
corpus we compiled within this rubric. Tammy Gales & Lawrence M. Solan, U.S. Statutes at Large 
(unpublished corpus) (on file with authors) [hereinafter USSL]. 
 67. Searches included the spelling variant “labour”. 
 68. U.S. Statutes at Large, HEINONLINE, https://home.heinonline.org/content/u-s-statutes-at-large/ 
[https://perma.cc/2YV6-ZCW8] (last visited Nov. 7, 2019). Statutes were collected from the HeinOnline 
database with the much-appreciated help of our research assistants. Files were converted into “.txt” files 
and the analysis was performed with AntConc. AntConc, LAURENCE ANTHONY’S WEBSITE, 
http://www.laurenceanthony.net/software/antconc/ [https://perma.cc/2D66-NTPC] (last visited Nov. 7, 
2019). 
 69. See CORPUS HIST. AM. ENG., https://www.english-corpora.org/coha/ (last visited Nov. 7, 2019) 
[hereinafter COHA]. 
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This corpus is comprised of 560 million words from 
1990–2017 and is balanced, i.e., equally divided, across 
five registers: spoken, fiction, magazines, newspapers, 
and academic texts.70 
•  Google Books Ngram Viewer 
The Ngram viewer function of Google Books allows 
users to search for words or phrases within millions of 
books in the Google collection (both copyrighted and 
out-of-copyright publications of books, reports, and 
documents).71 The results are displayed in a graph 
showing usage over time, and examples from each time 
period can be viewed individually within those time 
periods.72 
 
As with all corpus analyses, there are limitations. First, the results 
can only reflect the data represented in the corpora analyzed. Some of 
the following analyses investigated large, publicly available reference 
corpora (COCA and COHA), which contain language from a range of 
mostly written registers—newspapers, academic texts, magazines, and 
fiction books. As we discuss below, examinations of more specialized 
texts, such as statutes in USSL and nonfiction books in Google’s 
Ngram Viewer, provided additional insights into the uses of each term 
or phrase in question.73 This point is especially important when 
conducting legal analysis since Brigham Young University’s large 
reference corpora do not include legal documents as an independent 
category and tend to contain very few legal documents in general.74 
Second, the search features used here are not meant to be indicative 
of the full range of ways to search corpora; creating additional 
                                                                                                             
 70. COCA, supra note 63. 
 71. Ngram Viewer, GOOGLE BOOKS, https://books.google.com/ngrams [https://perma.cc/9Q9T-
RR8V] (last visited Nov. 7, 2019).   
 72. Id. Because Google preselects the time periods, those in the analysis below may not match the 
exact time periods selected for investigation in the BYU corpora. Id. The closest overlap of decades was 
chosen for use in the analysis. Id. 
 73. See infra Part III. 
 74. See generally Overview, BYU CORPORA, https://corpus.byu.edu/overview.asp 
[https://perma.cc/S47V-XNT9] (last visited Nov. 7, 2019). 
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specialized corpora, using other corpus software tools,75 and 
performing searches using regular expressions or different statistical 
measures may allow for a wider range of results.76 
That said, our findings support the Court’s conclusion, at least to the 
extent that it was based on how the language contained in the statute 
was actually used in the nineteenth century both in ordinary usage and 
in statutes. Specifically, when people spoke of what the clergy did, 
they rarely used the word “labor,” and when they used the word 
“labor,” they generally did so to describe manual labor, not something 
typically performed by clergy. Thus, “labor” and “clergy” were doubly 
dissociated. Furthermore, in both the Constitution and in earlier 
statutes, the compound phrase “labor or service” was used as an 
expression to mean the work of slaves—not the tasks of the clergy. As 
for the list of exceptions, to which we will return, one exception was 
for “lecturers.” In the nineteenth century, one meaning of that word 
was a junior member of the clergy in the Church of England.77 Thus, 
it should not be too surprising that the Congress that enacted this law 
recognized that it might be construed more broadly than the problem 
it was intending to address, but at the same time had confidence that 
the courts would exercise sufficient wisdom to construe the law 
consistent with its goals.78 
 
 
 
                                                                                                             
 75. See, e.g., WordSmith Tools, LEXICAL ANALYSIS SOFTWARE LTD., 
https://www.lexically.net/wordsmith/ [https://perma.cc/6E6M-WYR9] (last visited Nov. 7, 2019).  
 76. See generally Symposium, James C. Phillips & Jesse Egbert, A Concise How-to-Guide for Law 
and Corpus Linguistics: Importing Principles and Practices from Survey and Content-Analysis 
Methodologies to Improve Corpus Design and Analysis, 2017 BYU L. REV. 1589 (2018) (providing a 
more thorough discussion of the compilation and selection of corpora and the use of corpus tools in legal 
analyses). 
 77. Lecturer, THE OXFORD CONCISE DICTIONARY OF THE CHRISTIAN CHURCH (Elizabeth A. 
Livingstone ed., 3d ed. 2014) (1977). The Oxford Concise Dictionary of the Christian Church contains 
the following definition of “lecturers”: “Stipendiary ministers (often deacons), appointed in the century 
after 1559 by town corporations, parishes, and occasionally by individual laymen, to provide regular 
frequent preaching.” Id.; see also Lecturer (clergy), WIKIPEDIA,   
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lecturer_(clergy) [https://perma.cc/KYR4-W9G8] (last edited Sept. 30, 
2019). Our gratitude to William Eskridge for bringing this fact to our attention. 
 78. Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 465 (1892).  
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III.   Does the Alien Contract Labor Law Reflect Ordinary Language 
or Is It a Legal Term of Art? 
A.   “Labor or Service” in Statutory Language 
This case presents a problem not addressed by the Court. The term 
“labor or service” may not be a matter of ordinary meaning at all but 
may rather be a legal term of art used to describe the work of slaves. 
Article IV of the Constitution contains the following language: 
 
No Person held to Service or Labour in one State, under the 
Laws thereof, escaping into another, shall, in Consequence 
of any Law or Regulation therein, be discharged from such 
Service or Labour, but shall be delivered up on Claim of 
the Party to whom such Service or Labour may be due.79 
 
Similarly, both the Fugitive Slave Act of 1793 and the Fugitive 
Slave Act of 1850 contain precisely this expression.80 The 1793 Act 
required: 
 
And be it also enacted, That when a person held to labour in 
any of the United States, or in either of the Territories on the 
Northwest or South of the river Ohio, under the laws thereof, 
shall escape into any other part of the said States or Territory, 
the person to whom such labour or service may be due, his 
agent or attorney, is hereby empowered to seize or arrest 
such fugitive from labour, and to take him or her before any 
Judge of the Circuit or District Courts of the United 
States . . . .81 
 
                                                                                                             
 79. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2 (emphasis added). 
 80. Fugitive Slave Act of 1793, ch. 7, § 3, 1 Stat. 302, 302–03 (repealed 1864); Fugitive Slave Act of 
1850, ch. 60, § 6, 9 Stat. 462, 463 (repealed 1864).  
 81. § 3, 1 Stat. at 302–03 (emphasis added).  
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It is worth noting that this statute sometimes uses the expression 
“service or labor” and at other times refers only to “labor.”82 We see 
the same linguistic decision made by the Supreme Court in Holy 
Trinity Church, which focuses on the bald word “labor,” and 
emphasizes that the title of the statute contains the word “labor” but 
not the word “service” as justification for this analytical move.83 
Similarly, the 1850 Fugitive Slave Act contained the following 
language: 
 
And be it further enacted, That when a person held to service 
or labor in any State or Territory of the United States, has 
heretofore or shall hereafter escape into another State or 
Territory of the United States, the person or persons to whom 
such service or labor may be due . . . may pursue and 
reclaim such fugitive person, either by procuring a warrant 
from some of the courts, judges or commissioners 
aforesaid, . . . for the apprehension of such fugitive from 
service or labor, or by seizing and arresting such fugitive, 
where the same can be done without process, and by taking 
or causing such person to be taken, forthwith before such 
court, judge or commissioner . . . ; and upon satisfactory 
proof being made, . . . to use such reasonable force and 
restraint as may be necessary, under the circumstances of the 
case, to take and remove such fugitive person back to the 
State or Territory whence he or she may have escaped as 
aforesaid. In no trial or hearing under this act shall the 
testimony of such alleged fugitive be admitted in 
evidence . . . .84 
 
This language continues in usage today, although “service” has been 
replaced by “services” in statutory language. For example, the federal 
statute currently barring forced labor says: 
                                                                                                             
 82. Id. 
 83. Holy Trinity Church, 143 U.S. at 458–59. 
 84. § 6, 9 Stat. at 463 (emphasis added).  
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Whoever knowingly provides or obtains the labor or 
services of a person by any one of, or by any combination 
of, the following means— 
(1) by means of force, threats of force, physical 
restraint, or threats of physical restraint to that person 
or another person; 
(2) by means of serious harm or threats of serious harm 
to that person or another person; 
(3) by means of the abuse or threatened abuse of law or 
legal process; or 
(4) by means of any scheme, plan, or pattern intended 
to cause the person to believe that, if that person did not 
perform such labor or services, that person or another 
person would suffer serious harm or physical restraint,  
 shall be punished as provided under subsection (d).85 
 
The expression likely was recognized as a euphemism because the 
Thirteenth Amendment, which abolished slavery, speaks of “slavery” 
or “involuntary servitude” directly.86 
With these historically salient examples in mind, we determined to 
search the entire body of USSL to determine whether the words “labor 
or service” (in either order) were routinely used to refer to the type of 
manual labor that slaves engaged in, or whether the words, when used 
disjunctively as in the statutes, typically suggested a broader 
connotation. 
In USSL, “labor”87 occurred a total of 783 times and “service” a 
total of 1,903 times.88 The phrase “labor or service” occurred fifty-one 
times in nineteen statutes from 1789 to 1986. 
                                                                                                             
 85. 18 U.S.C. § 1589 (2018) (emphasis added). 
 86. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII (“Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for 
crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place 
subject to their jurisdiction.”).  
 87. See generally USSL, supra note 66 (including “labour”). Search: “labo*r”. 
 88. See generally id. Due to the age of some of the statutes, variations on spellings, line breaks, and 
character fonts caused some inconsistencies in the file conversion process. Id. Given the low frequencies 
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When examining the statutory language in context, fairly clear 
patterns of use over time can be traced: 
 
1. 1789–1863: Slaves, indentured servants, or those who 
perform forced manual labor. 
• 1 Stat. 53 (1789): Provided always, that any person 
escaping into the same, from whom labour or 
service is lawfully claimed in any one of the original 
States, such fugitive may be lawfully reclaimed, and 
conveyed to the person claiming his or her labour or 
service as aforesaid.89 
2.  1881–1907: Aliens, foreigners, and contract day laborers 
who perform manual (forced or temporary low-paid) labor. 
• 34 Stat. 898 (1902): That for every violation of any 
of the provisions of section four of this Act the 
persons, partnership, company, or corporation 
violating the same, by knowingly assisting, 
encouraging, or soliciting the migration or 
importation of any contract laborer into the United 
States shall forfeit and pay for every such offense the 
sum of one thousand dollars, which may be sued for 
and recovered by the United States, or by any person 
who shall first bring his action therefor in his own 
name and for his own benefit, including any such 
alien thus promised labor or service of any kind as 
aforesaid, as debts of like amount are now recovered 
in the courts of the United States; 
3.  1925–present: Workers or employees who perform 
voluntary manual, paid labor. 
                                                                                                             
of these occurrences, hand-correcting was not performed for these searches. For example, the following 
variations due to odd line breaks were not included: “labo” = 4, “labora” = 9, “labore” = 1 and “servi” = 
1, “servic” = 3. Id. However, for more concise results, hand-correcting for conversion errors is 
recommended. Id. 
   89.   Minor corrections were made to the corpus examples (e.g., removing hyphens from original line 
breaks and page numbers that were inserted into the text due to OCR conversion); however, the remainder 
of the text examples are presented verbatim from the original source. Bolding has been added for 
emphasis. 
18
Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 36, Iss. 5 [], Art. 7
https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol36/iss5/7
2020] REVISITING A CLASSIC PROBLEM 509 
• 54 Stat. 348 (1936): Any officer or agent of the 
United States whose duty it shall be to employ, 
direct, or control any person employed in connection 
with the operation or maintenance of such railroad 
who shall intentionally require or permit such person 
to be employed for hours of labor or service in 
violation of this Act shall be deemed guilty of a 
misdemeanor . . . . 
 
While the kinds of labor referred to in each of the statutory periods 
outlined above relate primarily to some kind of manual labor, the status 
of the participants performing such duties changed over time. Statutes 
in the earlier time period referred to the work performed by slaves or 
those who were indentured to others to perform such work. During the 
second period, there was a shift to manual laborers who performed 
usually low-paid contracted work. Finally, with the Railway Labor Act 
of 1926, statutes began to refer to “employees” and specialized 
technical positions such as “mechanics,” as well as workers who were 
able to “quit” if they desired. Examining the phrase in its reverse 
order—“service or labor”—resulted in similar frequencies (i.e., 
fifty-four total instances in thirty-two statutes from 1789–2008) and 
changes in meaning over time.90 
With respect to the first two of these periods, which cover the 
nineteenth century period relevant here, these facts raise an important 
linguistic question: whether the meaning of “labor or service” should 
be taken as a single construction or whether the terms are 
compositional, and should be examined separately according to their 
individual contribution to the meaning of the whole phrase. Linguist 
Adele Goldberg has focused on the extent to which language contains 
constructions that must be learned individually by children learning 
their native tongue.91 Linguist Ray Jackendoff has argued that there is 
                                                                                                             
 90. See generally USSL, supra note 66. 
 91. See generally ADELE E. GOLDBERG, CONSTRUCTIONS: A CONSTRUCTION GRAMMAR APPROACH 
TO ARGUMENT STRUCTURE (1995). 
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a continuum between the two in natural language.92 Examples of 
expressions as constructions include such idiomatic expressions as 
“hand over fist,” “head over heels,” “hand in glove,” “tongue in 
cheek,” and “hand to mouth.”93 The meanings of these expressions are 
not the sum of their parts.94 In contrast, language is most often 
compositional.95 A red truck is a truck that is red. When a menu says 
“soup or salad” it means soup or salad as a disjunctive phrase. The 
language at issue in Holy Trinity Church lands somewhere in the 
middle of this continuum. It can be understood as either a construction 
or as compositional. Samuel L. Bray has argued that certain clauses 
found in the Constitution, including “necessary and proper” and “cruel 
and unusual,” are actually constructions and should not be analyzed as 
compositional expressions.96 
It is not likely to be an accident that the statute at issue uses the 
language that traditionally describes the work of slaves in legal 
documents. Yet the historical facts suggest that Congress did not 
intend to limit the scope of the statute so aggressively. First, the statute 
speaks of “labor or service of any kind.”97 This modification suggests 
a broad interpretation. However, if “labor or service” is understood as 
a single construction meaning “slave-like work,” then the entire phrase 
means nothing more than slave-like work of any kind. The legislative 
history does not discuss the expression in these terms,98 but the 
historical use of this verbiage should nonetheless be taken seriously. 
                                                                                                             
 92. Ray Jackendoff, ‘Construction After Construction’ and Its Theoretical Challenges, 84 LANGUAGE 
8, 8 (2008). Constructions are typically inflexible when it comes to order (“hook, line and sinker,” not 
“sinker, line and hook”). Id. Thus, the language under discussion is not a prototypical construction. Id.  
 93. Id. at 8–9. 
 94. Id. 
 95. See generally JERRY A. FODOR & ERNEST LEPORE, THE COMPOSITIONALITY PAPERS (2002); 
PAULINE JACOBSON, COMPOSITIONAL SEMANTICS: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE SYNTACTIC/SEMANTIC 
INTERFACE (2014). 
 96. Samuel L. Bray, ‘Necessary AND Proper’ and ‘Cruel AND Unusual’: Hendiadys in the 
Constitution, 102 VA. L. REV. 687, 693 n.33 (2016). 
 97. Alien Contract Labor Law of 1885, ch. 164, § 1, 23 Stat. 332, 332 (amended 1887, 1888). 
    98. See Chomsky, supra note 8; Vermeule, supra note 8. We are grateful to Timothy Lytton and Julian 
Davis Mortenson for bringing to our attention the uncertainty of the psychological state of Congress with 
respect to this issue.  
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Second, as Adrian Vermeule emphasizes, the exceptions in the 
statute go beyond slave-like manual labor.99 If Congress so limited the 
statute in the first place, there would be no need to have listed these 
exceptions. 
The Court was well aware of these arguments and acknowledged 
them early in the opinion: 
 
It must be conceded that the act of the corporation is within 
the letter of this section, for the relation of rector to his 
church is one of service, and implies labor on the one side 
with compensation on the other. Not only are the general 
words “labor” and “service” both used, but also, as it were 
to guard against any narrow interpretation and emphasize a 
breadth of meaning, to them is added “of any kind;” and, 
further, as noticed by the circuit judge in his opinion, the 
fifth section, which makes specific exceptions, among them 
professional actors, artists, lecturers, singers, and domestic 
servants, strengthens the idea that every other kind of labor 
and service was intended to be reached by the first section.100 
 
Yet the Court determined that the purpose of the statute, the fact that 
the title of the statute mentioned only “labor,” and the ordinary 
meaning of “labor” outmatched the arguments to the contrary.101 
Of note are variants on the phrase “labor or service” (in either order) 
and on the application of the term “labor” that begin to appear in USSL 
around 1910 and increase steadily from 1926 onward—around the 
time of the Railway Labor Act. For example, the phrase is pluralized 
(e.g., “labor or services”), conjoined (“labor and service(s)”), and 
increasingly modified over time to refer to a broader range of workers 
(e.g., “labor” that is: “alien,” “contract,” “convict,” “railway,” 
“agricultural,” “day,” “farm,” “mechanical,” “skilled,” “unskilled,” 
and “temporary”). Statutes using such language generally referred to 
                                                                                                             
 99. See Vermeule, supra note 8, at 1851–57. 
 100. Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 459 (1892). 
 101. Id. at 513–14. 
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construction workers, janitors, maintenance crews, railway workers, 
and farmers, among other skilled and unskilled laborers.102 
Following the idea of double dissociation utilized in our earlier 
work,103 we examined instances of “work”104 as a variation of “labor” 
to see whether statutory language indeed covered a broader concept of 
employment-related activity using a term other than “labor.”105 
Interestingly, the use of “work” in USSL follows a pattern similar to 
that found with the variants of “labor or service” noted above.106 
“Work” begins to appear in these statutes around 1910 and increases 
dramatically in the 1930s to 1950s. In such cases, it is almost 
exclusively modified and used to refer to construction or government 
work (e.g., work that is “electrical,” “mechanical,” “road,” 
“sanitation,” “repair,” “construction,” and “street-cleaning”). For 
example: 
 
• 52 Stat. 156 (1938): All apportionments of 
appropriations for the use of the municipal architect 
in payment of personal services employed on 
construction work provided for by said 
appropriations shall be based on an amount not 
exceeding 3 per centum of a total of not more than 
$2,000,000 of appropriations made for such 
construction projects . . . . 
• 56 Stat. 424 (1942): That the services of draftsmen, 
assistant engineers, levelers, transitmen, rodmen, 
chainmen, computers, copyists, overseers, and 
inspectors temporarily required in connection with 
sewer, water, street, street-cleaning, or road 
work, or construction and repair of buildings and 
bridges, or any general or special engineering or 
                                                                                                             
 102. See Vermeule, supra note 8, at 1855 n.94. 
 103. Solan & Gales, supra note 41, at 1351–54. 
 104. See infra Part IV. Instances not related to the “labor” meaning (e.g., “a work of art” or “copyright 
works”) were excluded. 
 105. See infra Part IV.  
 106. See supra Part III.  
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construction work authorized by appropriations 
may be employed exclusively to carry into effect said 
appropriations when specifically and in writing 
ordered by the Commissioners . . . . 
 
These shifts in form and application are likely not arbitrary. 
Linguistic research has shown that some expressions, based on their 
social, cultural, or historical contexts, take on what is called semantic 
prosody, that is positive or negative connotations that are not typically 
included in dictionary definitions.107 In the case of “labor or service,” 
the origin and use of the phrase in statutory language were associated 
with slavery—a concept with extremely negative meaning.108 As 
society shifted views and practices, what appears to have been a term 
of art that was associated with negative practices came to be altered, 
perhaps lessening the negative prosody. As society entered the era of 
the Civil Conservation Corps and similar projects, focus was on work 
and more positive forms of labor. Statutes passed during these decades, 
such as the Railway Labor Act, reflect this shift to a more positive 
attitude toward labor and work, whether manual or not. 
IV.   “Labor or Service” in Ordinary Speech 
A.   Changes in Meaning over Time 
It is also possible to investigate the extent to which “labor or 
service” was used as a single construction by examining corpora of 
ordinary usage during the relevant periods and drawing inferences 
from the context in which the expression is used. In this case, we 
searched for the phrase in COHA, which covers the time period from 
1810–2010, and COCA, which covers the period from 1990–2017.109 
                                                                                                             
 107. Michael Stubbs, Quantitative Data on Multi-Word Sequences in English: The Case of the Word 
World, in TEXT, DISCOURSE AND CORPORA: THEORY AND ANALYSIS 163, 178 (Michael Hoey et al. eds., 
2007). 
 108. See Vermeule, supra note 8, at 1852. 
 109. COCA, supra note 63; COHA, supra note 69 (search “labo*r or service”). 
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In COHA, there were fourteen instances of the exact phrase “labor 
or service”.110 Ten referred to slaves or the work performed by slaves, 
one referred to the statute in question in this analysis, and three (two 
of which are quoted below) referred to paid industrial labor (1873 and 
1877) and domestic labor (1954): 
 
• 1873 (MAG):111 To keep the value of money 
uniform, the rate of interest must be kept uniform. 
Then it will distribute products equitably, according 
to the labor or service performed in their 
production; and without violating any principle of 
equity, restore to the industrial classes their natural 
rights of which they are now deprived by the present 
iniquitous system. 
• 1954 (NEWS): Its administrative paragraph set forth 
that any local law adopted by the city might contain 
provisions for exempting all work by domestic 
employes and? “for the exemption of any other 
wages for work, labor or service paid // at a rate not 
in excess e $1,200 per annum.”112 
 
In COCA, there were only two instances of “labor or service,” both 
of which referred to workers who held low-paying jobs. Specifically: 
 
• 2000 (ACAD): many young adults with histories of 
ED/BD tend to work only sporadically and hold 
low-paying labor or service jobs with few if any 
fringe benefits 
                                                                                                             
 110. COHA, supra note 69. This search does not include punctuation within or after the phrase. Other 
search queries may yield additional results. For example, see the lemma search below where commas are 
included in the results. Because they did not greatly alter the frequencies or content in any category, they 
were not included in the basic searches. 
 111. Id. Abbreviations for registers used in COHA refer to Fiction (FIC), Magazine (MAG), Newspaper 
(NEWS), and Non-Fiction Books (NF); abbreviations in COCA refer to Fiction (FIC), Magazine (MAG), 
Newspaper (NEWS), Academic (ACAD), and Spoken (SPOK). See ENGLISH-CORPORA.ORG, 
https://www.english-corpora.org/, for a more detailed description of the texts in each register. 
 112. COHA, supra note 69. Non-standard spellings and errors are included from the original. Bolding 
added for emphasis. 
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• 2014 (ACAD): 75% of Mexican immigrant mothers 
had less than a high school education, 79% worked 
in labor or service jobs, and 70% were below the 
poverty line. 
 
These findings are further amplified by a search on the phase in 
Google’s Ngram viewer, which provides general usage of words or 
terms over time based on searches of books, documents, and reports.  
 
Figure 1: Google Books Ngrams for “labor or service” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A closer look at the materials that reference “labor or service” 
during the height of use (approximately 1840–1900) provided results 
that were either official government documents or records, or 
historical works referring to such documents or records. For example: 
 
• Labor Laws of the United States (1896) 
• Special Report of the Commissioner of Labor (1896) 
• The Story of Manual Labor in All Lands and Ages 
(1886) 
 
When looking at the few texts in the more contemporary period 
(1960–2000), books and documents that used the phrase were similarly 
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nonfiction texts about historical laws, government labor bulletins, and 
legal documents. For example: 
 
• The Black Laws in the Old Northwest (1993) 
• Bulletin of the United States Bureau of Labor 
Statistics (1967) 
• Labor-management relations in the public service 
(1970) 
 
Given the infrequent use of “labor or service” in COHA, COCA, and 
Google Books to refer to much other than the original statutes or 
historical government publications, we then examined lemmas,113 or 
word forms, of the noun “labor” collocating with the noun “service” 
in the two time periods to investigate other ways the two terms were 
being used in proximity to each other. Our goal was to see whether 
ordinary language also reflected the shift in usage over time in 
statutory language. Looking only at the statutory term, “labor or 
service,” is not sufficient to answer this question. 
In COHA, there were 257 results, and in COCA, there were 129.114 
A random sample of 100 was taken from each corpus for further 
analysis.115 In COHA, there were approximately twelve instances that 
referred to the original statute and used the exact phrase “labor or 
service”; however, the majority of results used variations of the 
original phrase and moved away from references to slaves or slave-like 
labor. Interestingly, these variations precede similar variations found 
in USSL, which did not appear until later, around the time of the 
Railway Labor Act in 1926.116 Specifically, in COHA in the 1880s, 
“labor or service” is more frequently pluralized (e.g., “labor or 
services”), conjoined (e.g., “labor and service(s)”), and modified (e.g., 
“contract labor and civil service” or “camp labor and military 
                                                                                                             
 113. See, e.g., COCA, supra note 63; COHA, supra note 69. Lemma searches include all variants of a 
word—e.g., labor, labors, labour, etc. Lemma searches are represented in the text by CAPS. 
 114. COCA, supra note 63; COHA, supra note 69 (search “LABOR_nn* and SERVICE_nn* +/-3”;  
collocates). 
 115. COCA, supra note 63; COHA, supra note 69. Instances in each search that referred to names of 
labor organizations, government services, or other related agencies were excluded from the analysis. 
 116. COCA, supra note 63; COHA, supra note 69. 
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service”). And while some instances still refer to indentured-style 
labor, references also start to include more voluntary, contract-based 
manual employment. For example: 
 
• 1888 (MAG): Besides this assault upon Mr. 
Cleveland and the Democracy, there is little else in 
General Harrison’s letter, except some assurances 
that, while he was in the Senate, he gave votes that 
approved the declarations in the Republican platform 
on the subject of contract labor and civil 
service reform. 
• 1897 (MAG): There are others where such a period 
is prescribed, in the absence of contract, as to general 
industrial or mechanical labor; that is, to labor by the 
day, and not to farm labor or domestic service. 
 
In COCA, there are a few instances referring to the “fugitive slave 
clause”; however, as compared to COHA, COCA provides even more 
instances of conjoined or modified versions of “labor or service” and 
refers to a much broader range of employment—from physical to 
mental. For example: 
 
• 2011 (MAG): Many in labor and service who do 
belong to a union still benefit from the efforts of the 
union to increase wages and benefits, as well as to 
improve working conditions and social conditions. 
• 2016 (ACAD): The estimated cost of the entire 
project was about $1 million, though the vast 
majority of labor, services, and materials was 
donated. 
• 2017 (ACAD): “the Supreme Court . . . interpreted 
the FLSA to mean that unpaid intern volunteers at 
nonprofits are legal because such volunteers without 
promise or expectation of compensation, but solely 
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for their own pleasure, labor in the service of a 
cause that they believe in.” 
 
COCA shows that apart from references to the original statute, when 
contemporary writers use the terms “labor” and “service” to refer to 
slave-like duties, those instances are now modified. For instance: 
 
• 1998 (MAG): The sagging fortunes of the Canadian 
dollar may also help explain the sudden appeal of 
Cuba as a holiday destination; with virtual 
slave labor to provide services, package tours to 
Castro’s island are significantly cheaper than similar 
excursions to Florida or other Caribbean venues. 
• 2003 (ACAD): The UN protocol specifically 
addresses the trade in human beings for purposes of 
prostitution and other forms of sexual exploitation, 
forced labor or services, slavery or practices similar 
to slavery, servitude, and the removal of organs. 
 
Thus, the evidence points to the fact that “labor or service” has been 
used as a term of art to describe manual, often nonvoluntary, 
work-related activities both in the past and in the present.117 
Modifications of the term—beginning in the early time period and 
more commonly used today—expand the usage to refer to paid 
employment that is frequently physical, but may also possess a mental 
aspect, as described in the timeline below. 
“Labor or Service” Timeline 
• USSL 1780s–1860s: Fixed phrase used to refer to 
slaves, indentured servants, or others who perform 
forced manual labor. 
Compare COHA/COCA 1800s–2010s: Overall, the 
majority of instances of the fixed phrase “labor or 
                                                                                                             
117.   Also highlighted in the timeline is the fact that use of the terms in the language of ordinary citizens 
allowed for a broader range of meanings earlier than in statutory language across all time periods. 
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service” referred to the statutes under discussion. In 
COHA 1870s: The fixed phrase “labor or service” 
first used to refer to manual labor as a chosen 
profession.  
 
• USSL 1880s–1900s: Fixed phrase used to refer to 
aliens, foreigners, and contract day laborers who 
perform manual (mostly forced or low-paid 
temporary) labor. 
Compare COHA 1880s: Variations of “labor or 
service” begin to occur with increased applications 
for voluntary and/or permanent employment. 
 
• USSL 1910s–1920s: Variations of “labor or service” 
begin to occur with mixed applications to apply to 
forced and voluntary “labor”. “Work” also begins to 
appear to refer to paid manual labor of government 
workers and contractors. 
Compare COHA/COCA 1800s–2010s: “Work” 
appears throughout the time periods to refer to all 
meanings of “labor” (slave-like, forced, temporary, 
voluntary, permanent, etc.). 
 
• USSL 1920s–2000s: Variations of “labor or service” 
refer to workers or employees who perform mostly 
manual, voluntary paid labor. 
Compare COCA 1900s–present: Voluntary, paid 
labor (whether manual or mental) is the default use 
of “labor” and “service.” And in COCA 1990s–
present: References to the original slave-like 
“labor” and “service” are now the modified (i.e., 
marked) variations. 
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Note again that the statute at issue in this case contained the term 
modified by “of any kind,” but it appears that “labor or service” has 
only more recently been modified to take on the broader sense. 
B.   What People Mean When They Use “Labor” 
Since the Court focused on “labor” individually, we investigated 
that term further in relation to what “labor” means, who “labors,” and 
if those findings could apply to the activities that “clergy” perform. 
This portion of the analysis investigates two time periods and 
corpora: COHA (1880–1899), which covers the historic period in 
which the statute was enacted and challenged, and COCA (2010–
2017), which provides a contemporary comparison of the terms, 
presented in Table 1. 
 
Table 1: Time Periods and Corpora Investigated 
 
Statute: 1885 COHA: 1880–1889 
Decision: 1892 COHA: 1890–1899 
Contemporary: 2018 COCA: 2010–2017 
1.   What Does “Labor” Mean? 
Merriam Webster provides a definition of the noun “labor”118 as 
consisting of activities requiring physical or mental effort.119 
Definitions include, for example: 
 
• expenditure of physical or mental effort especially 
when difficult or compulsory (e.g., was sentenced to 
six months at hard labor)120 
                                                                                                             
 118. Labor, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/labor  
[https://perma.cc/P9GT-ZJHG] (last visited Nov. 7, 2019). 
 119. Id.  
 120. Id.  
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• human activity that provides the goods or services in 
an economy121 
• an economic group comprising those who do manual 
labor or work for wages122 
• workers available for employment (e.g., Immigrants 
provided a source of cheap labor).123 
 
Yet, the examples and synonyms presented highlight the physical 
aspects of the term (e.g., “grind, slavery, sweat, toil”) over the mental 
aspects.124 
An examination of adjectives collocating with “LABOR” in COHA 
and COCA also highlight the physical or manual aspects of “labor” 
with “manual” and “hard” occurring in the first two positions in both 
corpora, as shown in Table 2 below. 
 
Table 2: Top Ten Adjectives125 Collocating with “labor”126 
 
COHA: 1880–1899 Raw 
Freq. 
COCA: 2010–2017 Raw 
Freq. 
Manual 104 Manual 134 
Hard 92 Hard 128 
Organized 33 Cheap 118 
Skilled 32 Organized 101 
Productive 31 Forced 96 
Unskilled 25 Fair127 59 
                                                                                                             
 121. Id.  
 122. Id.  
 123. Id. 
 124. Labor, supra note 118. 
 125. COCA, supra note 63; COHA, supra note 69. “Central” was excluded from COHA since it referred 
only to the name of a particular union, and “immaterial” and “national” were excluded from COCA since 
the examples were only from a single publication and the name of a single organization, respectively. 
These examples further demonstrate the need to examine context when performing such analyses. 
 126. COCA, supra note 63; COHA, supra note 69 (search “LABOR and _j* +3”; collocates, MI = 3 or 
higher). 
 127. COCA, supra note 63; COHA, supra note 69. Instances of “fair” were almost exclusively used in 
reference to “fair labor associations” or “fair labor standards,” which further emphasize manual or 
physical labor, but also refer to hourly workers, more generally, with the “Fair Labor Standards Act.” 
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Cheap 24 Physical 46 
Arduous 22 Skilled 44 
Honest 21 Agricultural 23 
Patient 18 Environmental 22 
 
Other collocates such as “arduous,” “forced,” and “physical” further 
emphasize the physical aspect of the term and a keyword in context 
(KWIC) examination of “organized,” “unskilled,” “cheap,” “honest,” 
and “agricultural” provide additional instances of physical or manual 
labor, as in the following examples: 
 
• 1884 (MAG): It is one of the delusions that still abide 
in too many minds that the great industrial need of 
the South is cheap and unskilled labor, the toil of an 
ignorant peasantry. 
• 1882 (MAG): The cultivation of tobacco on a great 
scale required immense plantations and an 
abundance of cheap labor; and as among the white 
immigrants cheap labor was not forth-coming in 
sufficient quantity, recourse was at once had to the 
slave-trade. 
• 1882 (MAG): He is quick to perceive that, while 
“honest labor” dignifies the laborer because it is 
honest, it is not more dignified or honest because 
unintelligent, or such as can be performed as well by 
a steam-engine or a horse. It can not be questioned 
that it is precisely this aspect of farming—its 
supposed necessary association with hard, 
unintelligent, merely mechanical labor, unrelieved 
by any considerable use of the intellect - that has in 
the past caused it to be looked down upon as a pursuit 
unworthy of educated and intellectual men . . . . 
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In COHA, one of the adjectival collocates—“skilled”—was used in 
reference to both physical and mental aspects of “labor,” as in the 
following examples: 
 
• 1890 (MAG): With our productive machinery, with 
the inventive genius of our people constantly in 
advance of the world, with our cheap and skilled 
labor, we can produce, cheaper and better, more than 
half the products which the manufacturing people of 
Europe are distributing through the world, if we 
could obtain the materials at the same cost. 
• 1881 (MAG): Artistic labor, skilled labor, that 
which is done with the least waste of mental and 
bodily vigor, and accompanied with the highest 
wages, is that which best develops the individual for 
the advantage of society. 
 
The collocate “patient” in COHA was the only term that more often 
referenced the mental aspect of “labor,” typically in an educational 
setting, as in the following example: 
 
• 1892 (MAG): All science indeed has come to exist 
through the patient labors of students who have 
slowly done the work of unravelling the tangled web 
of interlaced actions, some part of which in turn each 
faithful inquirer must with the teacher’s aid repeat. 
 
The results from COHA and COCA demonstrate that while “labor” 
can be a mental activity, it is most often applied to contexts wherein 
physical or manual labor is occurring. 
All of this suggests that by the end of the nineteenth century, when 
the law was enacted and the case arose, the scope of “labor” had grown 
to include more than slave-like labor, and, at the margins, more than 
work that required physical exertion. 
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2.   Who “Labors”? 
When examining who performs “labor” in COHA and COCA, the 
majority of results can be grouped into two main semantic categories: 
(1) collocates that refer to working-class, forced, or slave-like workers 
(e.g., “slave,” “pauper,” “convict,” “agitators,” “child,” and 
“migrant”), and (2) collective noun collocates that refer to laborers as 
impersonal mass units (e.g., “class,” “ranks,” “market,” “supply,” and 
“pool”). As seen in Table 3, many terms possess both semantic 
qualities. 
 
Table 3: Top Ten Collocate Nouns128 Describing Those Who Perform 
“labor”129 
 
COHA: 1880–1899 Raw 
Freq. 
COCA: 2010–2017 Raw 
Freq. 
Classes 84 Market 585 
Slave 23 Force 525 
Market 30 Child 154 
Prison 19 Slave 90 
Pauper 18 Markets 81 
Ranks 13 Farm 45 
Poverty 13 Supply 41 
Convict 11 Pool 34 
Agitators 10 Migrant 31 
Missionary 10 Migration 29 
 
                                                                                                             
 128. COCA, supra note 63; COHA, supra note 69. There were other nouns collocating with “LABOR” 
such as “capital”, “hours”, and “problem”; collective nouns referring to entities that organize or manage 
laborers such as “union”, “federation”, and “bureau”; and proper titles and names of such organizations 
such as “secretary”, “division”, and “Knights”, but only those related to people who perform labor were 
included in this table. Id. Additionally, “day” was excluded from COCA since the context revealed its use 
almost exclusively referred to the holiday “Labor Day” and not “day laborers”, providing further support 
for a close contextual examination of the data. Id. 
 129. COCA, supra note 63; COHA, supra note 69 (search “LABOR and _nn* +/-3”; collocates, MI = 
3 or higher). 
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Examples from category 1—working-class, forced, or slave-like 
workers—include: 
 
• 1892 (NEWS): A bill designed to prevent the 
employment on public works of prison or convict 
labor or the products of such labor was reported to 
the House to-day from the Labor Committee by 
Representative Davis . . .  
• 1892 (NF): Large numbers of the alien laborers who 
are coming now, are little better than “slaves of 
contractors, steamship lines, and the professional 
European jobbers in pauper labor . . . 
 
Examples from category 2—collective nouns referring to laborers 
as impersonal mass units—include: 
 
• 1883 (MAG): It is not for the protection of the rich, 
but of the middle and less favored or manual labor 
classes, that public expenditure should be carefully 
guarded. 
• 2014 (NEWS): But in all seriousness, in Washington 
right now, the labor pool hasn’t caught up with the 
boom. It’s a real problem for hiring in restaurants, let 
alone in the government. 
 
Other nouns on the collocation list with “labor” related to qualities 
of those who “labor.” In most instances, the terms provided a negative 
prosody with respect to “laborers.” Negative terms included 
“problem,” “expense,” “troubles,” “disputes,” and “imprisonment.” 
The collocates that provided neutral or positive semantic prosody (e.g., 
“cost,” “products,” and “fruits”) did not reference the “laborers,” but 
the benefits received by the employers of the laborers. 
The one term that appeared to reference a positive quality of 
“laborers” was “dignity.” However, upon further examination, the 
structure of each sentence carried negative connotations given the 
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context of use. For example (italics added for emphasis of the 
negativity): 
 
• 1880 (MAG): The words spoken about the dignity of 
labor are not apt to be very sincere. 
• 1887 (FIC): to talk of dignity attaching to labor of 
any sort under the system then prevailing was 
absurd. 
 
Thus, despite the fact that dictionary definitions of “labor” do not 
mark the term with a positive or negative meaning, as speakers of a 
language, we tend to utilize words in a way that is shared by our 
community.130 In this case, the underlying tendency to frame “labor” 
in a negative manner may have additionally played a role in the Court’s 
decision to treat the activities of “clergy” as outside of the definition 
of “labor.”131 The way in which clergy were described as “brain 
toilers” suggests a conceptual distinction between laborers and the 
clergy132 as is further exemplified by this example that juxtaposes 
“clergymen,” who are of “professional classes,” with the “laboring 
classes”:133 
 
• 1880 (MAG): the professional classes have less 
bodily strength than the laboring classes, and that 
clergymen, in particular, are weak in the arm of flesh. 
 
Finally, we found an earlier exception from one magazine. A search 
for synonyms of “clergy” with collocates of “LABOR” resulted in 
three instances of “laboring clergy”134 from the 1830s and described 
                                                                                                             
 130. Joanna Channell, Corpus-Based Analysis of Evaluative Lexis, in EVALUATION IN TEXT: 
AUTHORIAL STANCE AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF DISCOURSE 38, 38–55 (Susan Hunston & Geoff 
Thompson eds., 2000). 
 131. Id. 
 132. See Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 464 (1892) (“It was never suggested that 
we had in this country a surplus of brain toilers, and, least of all, that the market for the services of 
Christian ministers was depressed by foreign competition.”). 
 133. COHA, supra note 69. 
 134. Id. (search “=clergy and LABOR +/-3”; collocates, MI = 3 or higher). The remaining results 
primarily referred to the UK Labor Ministry or Ministry of Labor, which were excluded. 
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“clergy” who were “the teachers of religion” as opposed to the 
“bishops and archbishops” who led the religious institutions. 
 
• 1832 (MAG): But whether it will be thought just, by 
the reformed Parliament, giving effect to the popular 
sense, to assess on the owner of the land the whole 
cost of supporting the teachers of religion,—which is 
the effect of the present system,—we do not pretend 
to say. That something will be done, and that 
speedily, with the Church, seems to be understood. It 
appears to be admitted, even on the present system, 
that its revenues require a new apportionment 
between the dignitaries and the laboring clergy. 
• 1835 (MAG): The average salaries paid to the 
bishops and archbishops exceed twenty-five 
thousand dollars a year, and some of them receive as 
much as a hundred thousand dollars; while a 
numerous class of the clergy, the laboring 
clergy too, are obliged to content themselves with a 
scanty subsistence. 
 
Because these were the only examples we found and they were from 
the same magazine (North American Review: Reform in England), we 
regard them as outliers. 
Thus, while there are instances in COCA of mental labor, as noted 
above, “labor” in both COHA and COCA appear to primarily relate to 
physical labor—oftentimes seen as an impersonal, yet organized, 
mass—and are referenced in a negative manner. The few instances that 
reference clergy juxtapose their work from that of “laborers” in both 
class and mental effort. 
3.   What Do Clergy Do? 
In order to examine more closely what actions “clergy” perform, we 
investigated verbs that collocate with “clergy,” as seen in Table 4. 
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Table 4: Top Ten Verbs135 Collocating with “clergy”136 
 
COHA: 1880–1899 Raw 
Freq. 
COCA: 2010–2017 Raw 
Freq. 
Opposed 4 Founded 8 
Bore 4 Estimates 8 
Accepted 4 Declared 6 
Attended 3 Ordained 5 
Announced 3 Marry 5 
Represented 3 Denied 5 
Arrogated 2 Refused 5 
Denouncing 2 Exercised 4 
Strained 2 Banned 4 
Deprived 2 Blamed 4 
 
The verbs on these lists—both in COHA and COCA—primarily 
reflect activities that are cognitive or communicative in nature and use. 
For example: 
 
• 1887 (NF):  [A]s a whole, the priesthood accepted, 
without any effective protest, the fires of the Council 
of Constance which consumed Huss, and the 
abominations of the Borgias at Rome. 
• 1898 (NF): The Federalist clergy joined in 
denouncing Jefferson on the ground that he was an 
atheist. 
                                                                                                             
 135. COCA, supra note 63; COHA, supra note 69. Instances of “changed,” “formed,” and “resigned” 
were excluded from the COHA list since they almost exclusively referred to UK government officials 
(“the ministry”) as opposed to religious leaders. In COCA, “issued,” “announced,” “estimates,” and 
“oversees” were excluded for similar reasons (i.e., foreign government ministries). It should be noted that 
in some of the other instances in both COHA and COCA, government ministries are referenced as well, 
but the verbs also frequently relate to activities performed by religious leaders, so they were included here 
for illustrative purposes. 
 136. COCA, supra note 63; COHA, supra note 69 (search “=clergy and _v* -3”; collocates, MI = 3 or 
higher). 
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• 2010 (NEWS): Experts who study Christian 
ministries said that whatever the reason for it, Dr. 
Dobson’s decision was extraordinary. # “I can’t 
think of another example where the leader of a major 
ministry organization founded it, built it up, then 
moved on and did something so visibly competitive,” 
said Stewart M. Hoover, director of the Center for 
Media, Religion and Culture at the University of 
Colorado, Boulder. 
• 2013 (MAG): One ministry declared simply: 
“Adoption is the new pregnant.” # All of this 
enthusiasm has created an army of advocates rallying 
to revive an international adoption business that has 
been on the wane since 2004, and has reoriented the 
industry in a more overtly religious direction. 
 
These results demonstrate that the primary functions of “clergy” are 
not manual, indentured-like labor, but activities that require more 
cognitive duties such as “denouncing,” “declaring,” and “opposing.” 
Finally, since few collocations between “clergy” and “LABOR” 
were found in the previous section describing who labors, we 
examined “work” as a common synonym of “labor” from the statutory 
corpus in connection to activities performed by “clergy.” In both 
corpora, examples were similar to the other activities performed by 
“clergy”—i.e., those that are more representative of “work” that is 
spiritual or mental in nature. For example: 
 
• 1886 (MAG): the priesthood could work miracles 
• 2014 (MAG): As he explained his work with a 
prison ministry in Texas, I found myself surprised 
and asked why he was involved. He said, “More than 
a decade ago, I realized that when Jesus tells us to 
feed the hungry, cloth the naked, and visit the 
prisoner, he actually means it.” 
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• 2013 (MAG): Most important, he believes ministry 
leaders must work from a place of love. 
 
Interestingly, in light of how the statute was interpreted, “service” 
was mostly left out of consideration in the opinion. The same 
dictionary previously cited defines the noun “service” as including 
features related to employment as well as the act of doing something 
positive for another person.137 For example: 
 
• the occupation or function of serving (e.g., in active 
service) 
• employment as a servant (e.g., entered his service) 
• contribution to the welfare of others (e.g., glad to be 
of service) 
• a meeting for worship—often used in plural (e.g., 
held evening services) 
• the act of serving, such as a helpful act (e.g., did him 
a service) 
• useful labor that does not produce a tangible 
commodity—usually used in plural (e.g., charge for 
professional services) 
 
The senses of “service” are mixed between activities related to being 
in servitude and providing something of helpful service, which, given 
the corpus findings above, could clearly relate to the activities of the 
“clergy.” 
An investigation in the two relevant time periods of the collocates 
“clergy” (and its synonyms) and “SERVICE” produced a few hits: five 
in COHA and twenty-five in COCA.138 For example: 
 
                                                                                                             
 137. Service, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/service 
[https://perma.cc/2J3M-V6A9] (last visited Nov. 7, 2019).  
 138. COCA, supra note 63; COHA, supra note 69 (search “=clergy and SERVICE +/-4”; collocates). 
This number increases to twenty-four in COHA and sixty-nine in COCA with the search: “=clergy and 
=service +/-4”; collocates. This includes collocates such as “assistance,” “benefit,” and “help” in both 
corpora, which further describe the spiritual, nonmanual work the “clergy” provide. 
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• 1882 (MAG): FOR a while after his reception, Mr. 
Newman proposed to devote himself to some secular 
calling, but Cardinal Wiseman, in whose hands he 
had placed himself decided otherwise; and, indeed, it 
must have been obvious to all the leading members 
of the church which now had gained him that so great 
gifts of preaching, such deep theological // learning, 
so keen a power of analyzing the workings of the 
human heart, should be available for the service of 
the priesthood. 
• 1892 (MAG): Arthur Brooks, now rector of the 
Church of the Incarnation in New York City, and the 
Rev. John Cotton Brooks, now rector of Christ 
Church, Springfield, and also of his other brother, the 
late Frederick Brooks, who died while rector of St. 
Paul’s Church, Cleveland, and who gave abundant 
promise of a brilliant and successful service in the 
Episcopal ministry. 
• 2011 (MAG): I encourage you to pursue your 
important ministry in the service of the church, 
sustained by the vigilant attention of your bishop and 
the unending prayers of the Christian community. 
• 2016 (MAG): The ministry offers an uncommon 
service, given that white-collar criminals and their 
families have little social support other than online 
forums. 
 
Given the instances provided above, the outcome of Holy Trinity 
Church may have been decided differently if the Court had 
investigated the meaning and use of “service” when collocated with 
the “work” “clergy” perform. Yet, as we tried to demonstrate above, 
the phrase “labor or service” had its own meaning in statutory 
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language, and a negative connotation that went beyond the meanings 
of the individual terms.139 
SUMMARY 
Analysis of data from USSL, COHA, COCA, and Google Books 
suggests the following facts: 
 
• “Labor or Service” in either order was used through 
most of the nineteenth century to refer to manual, 
slave-like labor. 
• In legal contexts, the expression was used to 
specifically characterize slaves themselves. 
Article IV of the Constitution contains a fugitive 
slave provision that uses exactly that language, and 
the Fugitive Slave Acts of 1793 and 1850 do so as 
well, as do other statutes from that era. 
 
It is therefore not clear whether to consider “labor or service” as a 
single construction meaning the type of work that slaves perform or as 
an ordinary compound disjunctive noun phrase. That is, one can ask 
either about the expression “labor or service” or about “labor” and 
“service” separately. The Court seemed to choose the latter course, 
although we argue here that the former course may have been more 
faithful to the meaning of the term as understood at the time based on 
the following:  
 
• When the activities of clergy were represented in the 
corpora, “labor” was rarely used other than in “labor 
of the Lord” and similar expressions. Yet, while rare, 
the corpus demonstrated occasional use of “labor” in 
connection with the tasks that members of the clergy 
performed. 
                                                                                                             
 139. COCA, supra note 63; COHA, supra note 69. 
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• When the corpora demonstrated that clergy perform 
a “service,” it was either in the sense of being “in the 
service of the lord” or providing a positive “service” 
to the community. However, the decision placed 
more focus on the former term—“labor”—than on 
the latter—“service.” 
 
It appears to us that the Court got the ordinary meaning argument 
correct based on corpus analysis: The statute could be construed to 
apply to a member of the clergy hired under contract by a church, but 
it would be an outlying use of the language, notwithstanding the fact 
that the statute includes “labor or service of any kind.” As for concern 
about the clergy not being listed among the exceptions, the argument 
may not be as strong as it initially seemed, but we certainly do not 
claim it to be irrelevant. Thus, we take no stand on the Supreme 
Court’s actual holding, but the history of usage in both statutory and 
ordinary language do support the Court’s decision. 
Returning to the discussion at the start of this article, we have 
attempted to strengthen the use of corpus linguistic analysis by relying 
on doubly dissociated terms, such as “labor” and “clergy,” highlighting 
the value of creating or consulting specialized corpora to investigate 
whether the statutory language reflects ordinary usage or carries a 
specialized legal meaning, and exploring inferences that can be drawn 
from collocational information in addition to the frequency of word 
usage. Our goal has been to demonstrate how corpus analysis can be 
of help in exploring historical cases, for which introspection about 
meaning is unavailable. 
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